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Abstract: Social events are rich in information, yet research into how people remember such 
events has typically been limited to considering one aspect (e.g., faces, behaviors) at a 
time. Based on an internal meta-analysis of a programme work encompassing 15 laboratory, 
field, and on-line experiments involving 1230 participants, we found that construal level 
influences both the ability to recognise people involved in the event (d = 0.30) and the way 
the social aspects of the event are described (average d = 0.48). In contrast, memory for 
background objects/scenes that were present during the event was unaffected by construal 
level. We discuss these findings in terms of their implications for both event memory (and 
situations where different aspects of the same event are remembered) and for construal level 
(and the question of how and when construal is likely to affect memory).  
 
  




Remembering Social Events: A Construal Level Approach 
Social encounters are rich in information – not only do they involve other people 
whose appearance and behavior are easily observed and encoded in terms of their social 
group or trait implications, but they often take place in complex physical environments.  
Moreover, all of these aspects are dynamic – others’ behavior and its meaning, as well as 
one’s view of (and attention to) the physical environment, may change frequently over time, 
often within a single interaction. All of this information may be attended to, encoded, and 
eventually stored in memory, available to be retrieved at a later point in time in order to 
reconstruct what happened during the encounter. Although many aspects of how people 
retrieve information from event representations have been studied empirically (for a review 
of research on memory for behaviors, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Wyer, 2013; for a 
review of research on memory for faces, see Bruce & Young, 1986, 2012; and for a review of 
research on memory for objects and natural scenes, see Hollingworth, 2006; Hollingworth, 
Williams, & Henderson, 2001), each of these investigations has focused on memory for a 
single aspect of an event. In the present article, we report a programme of work that sought to 
explore how people remember a wide spectrum of social and non-social information to which 
they might be exposed during a social encounter.  
In doing so, we were particularly interested in discovering how information about 
different elements of an event can be retrieved using different processing styles. As reviewed 
below, there are potential parallels between modes of processing as applied to visual and 
behavioral information. Not only can visual stimuli (e.g., faces) be processed in terms of both 
their specific features and their holistic appearance, but specific behavior observations can 
also be construed in terms of both their specific details and their broader meaning (Winter & 
Uleman, 1984). In order to further our understanding of whether such distinctions share 




common processes, we adopted the framework of Construal Level Theory (CLT, Trope & 
Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014).  
Construal Level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014) focuses 
on how events that are psychologically close or distant are interpreted, or construed. In 
particular, it posits that thinking about events that are close (e.g., in time or space) induces a 
‘low level construal,’ characterised by more concrete or detailed processing related to the 
event. In contrast, thinking about events that are farther away induces a ‘high level construal,’ 
characterised by more abstract or holistic processing. For example, when planning what to 
pack for a holiday the weekend before leaving, one is likely to think about specific items (flip 
flops, toothbrush, paperback novel). On the other hand, when thinking about what to bring for 
the same holiday several months in advance, one is more likely to consider broad categories 
of items (clothing, toiletries, entertainment). 
In the present work, we explored the possibility that the distinction between low-level 
and high-level construal might have parallel effects on visual and semantic processing of a 
social event: More specifically, we tested the hypothesis that high-level (vs low-level) 
construal would lead to more holistic (vs. featural) processing of faces encountered during an 
event, as well as more abstract (vs. concrete) processing of behaviors executed during the 
encounter. As a result, we should expect that faces and behavioral information should be 
remembered in different ways depending on the level of construal at which one is operating. 
Because attention during social events tends to focus on people (the participants in the event) 
to the neglect of background information (e.g., objects), [Wentura, Rotherman, & Bak, 2000] 
we anticipated that construal level would have a stronger influence on how people remember 
social information, in comparison to background or contextual information. Below, we 
review existing evidence for these hypotheses and consider possible mechanisms that might 
underlie the effects of construal level on social memory.   




How do psychological distance and construal level affect processing style? 
Manipulations of various dimensions of psychological distance have been found to 
influence subsequent decisions and judgments relating to that target event (e.g., Liberman & 
Trope, 1998; Liberman, Trope, McCrea & Sherman, 2007) as well as to processing on 
unrelated tasks (e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Smith & Trope, 2006). 
Notably, manipulations of psychological distance (versus proximity) have been reported to 
improve performance on tasks believed to measure global processing, such as the Snowy 
Pictures Test and the Gestalt Completion Test (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006) 
while at the same time impairing performance on tasks believed to measure local processing 
such as the Embedded Figures Test (Smith & Trope, 2006; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 
1971). Thus, psychological distance (and by extension construal level) appears to have broad 
implications for information processing styles, which can then be transferred to subsequent 
logically unrelated tasks. 
The link between psychological distance and construal level is believed to derive from 
different attentional processes applied to proximal vs. distal events. The more immediate or 
proximal an action or event is, the more it necessitates attention to the steps involved in 
carrying it out. For example, when standing at your front door and reaching for your house 
keys, attention is guided towards the motor responses required to fit the key in the lock in 
order to open the door. On the other hand, whilst at work in the mid-afternoon and thinking 
about arriving home at the end of the day, your attention is more likely focused on the goal to 
start the evening in the comfort of your own home – fitting the key to the front door lock is 
but one detail of the event and is unlikely to attract much attention. Thus, proximal events 
focus our attention on how to do things, whereas distal events focus our attention on why we 
do things. 




Supporting this reasoning, construal level has also been manipulated without 
reference to any dimension of distance, but asking participants to describe ‘how’ vs. ‘why’ 
they would undertake an action (e.g., maintaining good health). As suggested above, the 
question of ‘how’ has been found to induce low-level construal, while the question of ‘why’ 
they would undertake the same action induces high-level construal (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & 
Trope, 2004). Such exercises are intended to be more direct manipulations of construal level, 
as they require either concrete and detailed thinking (in order to describe how something is 
done) or more abstract and holistic thinking (to describe why something is done). Such 
manipulations have demonstrably affected not only processing of the target action, but also 
processing that occurs in subsequent tasks (e.g., Fujita, Liberman, & Trope, 2006). 
Thus, CLT has gained influence in recent years for its ability to explain and predict a 
wide range of outcomes, from perception (Liberman & Forster, 2009) to judgments and 
decisions (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). Yet to date, tests of CLT within a single 
study have largely focused on specific and isolated outcomes. As outlined below, the case of 
event memory provides an opportunity to test the implications of CLT for memory across a 
broad range of stimuli (visual vs. behavioral), aspects of those stimuli (featural vs holistic), 
contexts (laboratory vs. in the field vs. in one’s personal past), and physical involvement 
(being physically present during the event vs. observing a recording of a past event).  
Information Available Within Social Events 
Our key assertion is that the information contained within a social event can be 
encoded and retrieved using distinct modes of cognitive processing. Construal Level Theory 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014) posits that differences in the way a 
stimulus is construed have general implications for concurrent and subsequent information 
processing. Specifically, ‘low-level’ construal involves interpreting a stimulus in a concrete 
manner, and lends itself to more detail-oriented or feature-focused processing. In contrast, 




‘high-level’ construal entails interpreting a stimulus in a more abstract manner, and results in 
more holistic, gestalt or configural processing. Although research stemming from Construal 
Level Theory has typically examined consequences for processing the very object of 
construal, preliminary evidence (discussed below) suggests that construal manipulations also 
carry over to influence processing style in relation to unrelated stimuli. In this section, we 
briefly review how relatively abstract vs. detail-oriented processing (argued to characterise 
high-level vs low-level construal, respectively) influences memory for different elements of 
social events.1 
Recognizing Faces  
An extensive literature of face recognition supports the proposal that accurate face 
recognition is enhanced when people adopt a global or holistic processing style and hindered 
when they adopt a featural processing style. This support comes from two lines of research. 
In the first of these, researchers have manipulated processing style after encoding, but prior to 
test, and observed differences in performance on face recognition tasks. For example, Macrae 
and Lewis (2002) reported that participants who completed the ‘global’ version of a Navon 
task (in which they identified large letter shapes; see Navon, 1977) during the retention 
interval were nearly three times more likely to correctly identify (from a line-up) a 
perpetrator of a crime than were participants who completed the ‘local’ version of the same 
task (in which they identified smaller letters that formed the large letter shape). This effect 
has since been replicated in field studies (Perfect, Dennis & Snell, 2007), and suggests that 
global processing of Navon letters carries over to influence face processing in an unrelated 
task. Moreover, Weston and Perfect (2005; see also Perfect, 2003) found that participants 
who first completed a local Navon task were quicker at recognizing one half of a composite 
 
1 As noted previously, there are extensive, though separate, literatures on memory for faces, behaviors, objects 
and scenes. For purposes of brevity, we restrict the present review to work that is particularly relevant to how 
processing style might affect each of these elements, particularly in the context of social events. 




face (i.e., the top of one face paired with the bottom of a different face). In other words, they 
were able to focus attention on individual features and suppress the holistic image of the 
entire composite. 
Further research lends support to the interpretation that manipulations of global vs. 
local processing affect face recognition by influencing the extent to which perceivers are able 
to make use of the configural vs. feature information present in a face. For example, work by 
Martin and Macrae (2010) shows that individual differences in ‘global precedence’ (i.e., the 
tendency to process Navon stimuli in a global manner) predicted the magnitude of the face 
inversion effect (FIE; i.e., the decrease in face recognition accuracy when target faces are 
presented upside-down at test), with participants who showed a stronger global precedence 
also producing a larger FIE. 
 Evidence for a link between global processing and superior face recognition is not 
limited to studies employing Navon manipulations. For example, Perfect et al (2007) asked 
participants to judge new faces either in terms of a feature (detailed information) or their 
personality (holistic information) during the interval between studying and recognizing 
unrelated faces. This manipulation produced the same effects as using the visuo-spatial 
Navon task: that is, the induction to judge a holistic attribute (personality) resulted in superior 
face recognition compared to an induction to focus on a perceptual detail (facial feature). 
Other work also suggests that manipulations that induce feature-based processing 
(e.g., providing verbal descriptions, Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; processing other-
race faces, Meissner & Brigham, 2001, Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; describing cars, 
Westerman & Larssen, 1997) undermine face recognition performance. Finally, Wyer, 
Perfect, and Pahl (2010) manipulated psychological distance by asking participants to think 
about an event in the near vs. far future during the interval between encountering a 
confederate and being asked to identify them from an array of photographs, and found that 




performance was superior in the distant future conditions. Such manipulations of 
psychological distance have been commonly used to induce low- vs. high-level construal 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014) which are, in turn, associated with 
relatively detail-based vs. holistic processing. In Wyer et al.’s (2010) studies, this 
manipulation then influenced face recognition accuracy, with greater distance (associated 
with high-level construal and holistic processing) leading to better recognition and greater 
proximity (associated with low-level construal and detail-based processing) being associated 
with poorer performance.  
In a related line of work, Schwartz and Yovel (2016, 2019a, 2019b) have argued (and 
provided evidence) for the notion that face learning is improved when faces are treated in 
terms of their conceptual properties (e.g., the name or identity of the person shown) rather 
than as mere perceptual stimuli. In their studies, participants who are exposed to a single 
view of a face outperform those who are shown multiple views from different angles, if that 
single view was paired with a name (giving it an identity). Intriguingly, this phenomenon 
appears not to be driven by differences in processing style or elaboration. 
Recollecting Behaviors  
While the distinction between holistic and detail-oriented processing styles has 
received considerable attention within the literature on face recognition, the question of how 
those styles influence memory for other types of information has received scant attention. 
Nonetheless, memory for social events is likely to include not only what others look like but 
how they behave, and what that behavior means for their personalities, moods, and goals. The 
literature on person memory has focused primarily on the extent to which specific behavioral 
details are retained in memory after an overall impression has been formed on the basis of 
those details (see Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984).  
Studies into retrieval processes have been limited to testing hypotheses about associative 




links among behavioral episodes and between such episodes and the abstract personality traits 
that they reflect.  
Thus, research into person memory has paid little attention to the role of processing 
styles in determining what is eventually recalled. Although evidence suggests that the 
capacity for systematic (vs. heuristic) processing influences the nature of recall (e.g., Bargh 
& Thein, 1985), this distinction bears more directly on depth of processing rather than style 
of processing. That is, experiments examining memory for behavioral information have 
reliably demonstrated that when perceivers elaborate on or reason about a target’s behavior 
(e.g., as when reconciling an apparently inconsistent behavior with the rest of one’s 
knowledge about the target; see Srull & Wyer, 1989 for a review), the ability to later recall 
that behavior is enhanced. In contrast, research investigating whether and how global or local 
processing styles affect behavioral memory is all but non-existent (cf. Wyer et al., 2010).   
Reconstructing the Background/Context 
Social events typically include background objects and contextual information, but 
there is little research on memory for these within social contexts. There is, of course, reason 
to suspect that memory for objects and other contextual information might be generally poor 
when that information is encountered in the context of a social interaction. The salience of 
social behavior is likely to dominate attention (Wentura et al., 2000) such that other 
information is poorly encoded. Yet, there may be conditions in which such background 
details do attract attention and may be retrieved later. Evidence from cross-cultural studies 
(e.g., Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; see also Amer, Ngo, & Hasher, 2016) suggests 
that individuals from cultures with a more holistic processing style (e.g., East Asians) are 
more likely to recognize background contexts (vs. focal objects) from a visual scene than are 
those with from a culture with a more detail-oriented processing style (e.g. Europeans or 
North Americans). In contrast, holistic processing is associated with inferior recognition of 




specific objects, particularly when those objects are presented against novel backgrounds (see 
Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005). Thus, individual differences in the tendency for holistic 
processing appear to predict the ability to accurately recognize contextual information (such 
as background information in a complex scene). 
Cultural influences notwithstanding, evidence suggests that details of objects 
encountered within dynamic scenes (i.e., not static images – see Bainbridge, Hall, & Baker, 
2019 for evidence of object memory from static scenes) are scarcely encoded at all (Hirose, 
Kennedy, & Tatler, 2010). The phenomenon of ‘change blindness’ (Simons & Rensink, 2005; 
Varakin, Levin, & Collins, 2007) reflects this – although perceivers may detect that an object 
is present within a dynamic scene, they often fail to recognize when that specific object is 
replaced with a different one. Thus, under most circumstances, background objects may be 
less likely to afford multiple levels of encoding (i.e., of detailed or holistic information) in the 
same way that human faces or social behaviour does. That is, when one encounters an object, 
we may not encode it in a great amount of detail under standard conditions. For example, 
imagine walking into a friend’s kitchen and seeing a blue coffee mug with some writing on it 
on the counter. Under standard conditions, you are likely to encode that object as merely 
‘mug’ or perhaps ‘blue mug.’ Unless you carefully inspect the mug (e.g., because you use it 
yourself, or because your friend asks you to bring her ‘the blue mug with ‘a yawn is a silent 
scream for coffee’ printed on it’ to differentiate it from available coffee mugs) you are 
unlikely to encode its finer details. 
When Might Construal Level Influence Remembering? 
 In formulating hypotheses about construal level’s likely effects on recognition and 
recall of different elements of a social event, it is not sufficient to speculate about the possible 
mechanisms through which such effects might emerge. We must also consider whether those 
mechanisms apply equally across distinct elements. That is, do variations in processing style 




at test, memory search, and reporting decisions have the same potential to affect different 
measures of memory, and memory for diverse event elements?  
When information contains salient detailed and holistic information. What does this 
analysis suggest about the effects of construal level on memory for various elements of a 
social event? We propose that a critical factor in determining whether construal level affects 
memory outcomes is the extent to which elements of an event are encoded at multiple levels. 
Some elements of a social encounter are readily amenable to encoding at multiple levels. For 
example, behavioral episodes are likely to convey both specific details (what was done) as 
well as abstracted inferences about goals, traits, and emotions (why it was done). Both levels 
of meaning are likely to be encoded when a behavior is observed (Klein, Loftus, & Sherman, 
1993; Winter & Uleman, 1984). Likewise, when encountering faces, perceivers encode both 
their features and holistic aspects (as evidenced by well-above-chance levels of recognition of 
face parts (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and inverted faces (Yin, 1969). As such, these elements of 
a social stimulus are more likely to be influenced by shifts in construal which can alter the 
nature of the memory that is reported. On the other hand, as noted above, there is little 
evidence from which to speculate that objects and other aspects of the physical environment 
are routinely encoded at multiple levels. Thus, the extent to which memory for those elements 
might be affected by construal level at retrieval is less certain. 
The role of personal involvement: One aspect that has not yet been discussed, but 
which is relevant to the research presented here, is the extent to which one is personally 
involved in the target event. In the course of our daily lives, we not only participate in social 
events but also observe those in which we are not personally involved as they unfold before 
us. In the case that we are merely observers, personal distance from the event may vary from 
close (as when we notice a couple having an argument at the next table at a restaurant) to 
remote (as when we watch television news coverage of something happening far away).  




Personal involvement may moderate the effects of construal on event memory in two 
potential ways. First, high levels of personal involvement may invoke psychological 
proximity and thus promote low-level construal directly. In this case, we might expect low-
level construal manipulations to have little effect (as the detail-oriented processing style that 
they are expected to induce should already be in operation). In contrast, low levels of 
personal involvement may entail greater psychological distance and thereby high-level 
construal. In that case, we may find that high-level construal manipulations have little effect 
(as the holistic processing style that they induce should already be in use). In other words, the 
effects of manipulating construal may be asymmetric, with larger effects observed when the 
manipulate contravenes the default processing style. 
A second way in which personal involvement may impact on the effects of construal 
level is by altering the extent to which information is encoded in terms of both its holistic and 
detailed aspects. When personal involvement is low, perceivers may encode information only 
superficially, and may come away with only the gist of what happened during an event. In 
this case, manipulations that encourage detail-oriented processing are likely to have little 
effect on retrieval because event details have not been stored in memory in the first place. In 
contrast, high levels of personal involvement are likely to entail greater attention to all 
aspects of an event, including both detailed and holistic elements. If so, we should expect that 
the effects of construal level should be particularly strong when personal involvement is high, 
but weak or non-existent when personal involvement is low. Indeed, in other domains (e.g., 
the cognitive interview; see Kohnken et al, 2008), manipulations to improve event memory 
have proven to be most effective when personal involvement is high, presumably because 
there is a richer memory representation that can be accessed in more or less effective ways 
(as opposed to events that receive little attention, where memory is likely to be poor 
regardless of the retrieval conditions). 




Summary: Formulating Predictions About Construal Effects on Remembering 
 In summary, then, while the influence of construal level on how people attend to, 
evaluate, and encode information is relatively well understood, little is known about how 
construal might alter how people retrieve information once it has been stored in memory. We 
aim to investigate the effects of construal level on how people remember events – an outcome 
that has been largely neglected in the plethora of research stemming from CLT (recent work 
linking construal level with working memory notwithstanding, Hadar, Luria & Liberman, 
2019). In particular, because of the uniquely multifaceted nature of social events, we focus on 
testing the hypothesis that construal level affects one’s retrieval of various aspects of one’s 
memory for a social encounter in distinct ways. We focused our investigation primarily on 
memory for visual and behavioral information, largely because these mapped onto both the 
expertise of the research team and because the evidence base relating to face memory and 
person memory is more extensive than other aspects that might also be considered (e.g., 
memory for sounds, or memory for the temporal order of events): 
1. Faces: Work on face processing (Wyer et al., 2015b; Wyer, Hollins, & Pahl, 
2015a) has demonstrated that manipulations producing high level construal 
encourage holistic processing (and hence greater accuracy) during face 
recognition tasks. Thus, we expect that high-level (relative to low-level) construal 
will be associated with more accurate recognition of faces encountered during 
social events. 
2. Free Recall of Behavior: Prior research investigating memory for others’ behavior 
suggests that when an unfamiliar target is encountered, specific behaviors are 
encoded along with the trait implications of those behaviors (Hamilton et al, 
1980). Thus, when prompted to recall information about a social encounter, 
perceivers should have access to both details of a target’s behavior and the 




meaning (e.g., personality trait inferences) ascribed to that behavior. We therefore 
expect that construal level will guide free recall of behaviors observed during 
social events, such that high-level construal will encourage retrieval of meaning-
related information (e.g., personality trait inferences) whereas low-level construal 
will encourage retrieval of behavioral details. 
3.  Cued Recall: On the other hand, direct questions about the factual elements of a 
social event may not allow for flexibility to retrieve meaning vs detail from the 
event. We would therefore not expect to observe that construal level influences 
performance on closed-ended tests of memory for the event. 
4. Background: We do not expect the memory advantage produced by high-level 
(relative to low-level) construal to generalise to object or background/contexts that 
are encountered in social interactions. We speculate that background information 
will be less focal and hence less likely to be encoded at multiple levels, making it 
less amenable to construal effects at retrieval. 
5. Physical Presence: As alluded to above, we posit that greater personal 
involvement in an event is likely to result in richer memory representations. In the 
current work, the need to maintain experimental control meant that participants 
were typically not directly involved in the social encounters that served as 
memory targets. However, there was variation in the extent to which participants 
were physically present when the events occurred, and we use physical presence 
as a (albeit imperfect) proxy of personal involvement.  
It is worth highlighting the point that we do not predict an overall advantage for high-
level vs. low-level construal. Such generic superiority might be easily attributable to 
differences in motivation created by one or the other construal level, or by a general shift in 
retrieval strategy that improves memory across the board. Instead, we have identified specific 




elements of memory that, theoretically, should be susceptible to construal level influences, 
and other elements that are less likely to be affected.  
Early Evidence 
As noted earlier, there is little research on how processing style influences memory for 
different aspects of an event. Earlier research from our own team (Wyer, Perfect, & Pahl, 
2010) represents the single exception. In these studies, participants encountered a confederate 
prior to an experimental task that independently manipulated psychological distance. 
Following the manipulation, participants’ memory for different aspects of the initial 
encounter was assessed. In both studies, participants in a distant-future condition were 
significantly more likely to be able to pick the confederate out of a line-up. One of the studies 
also required participants to give a verbal description of the initial encounter with the 
confederate which was coded for the nature of the descriptions used. Distant-future-focused 
participants were more likely to describe the meaning of the event (what the confederate 
wanted, the confederate’s personality) whilst near-future-focused participants were more 
likely to describe the specific sequence of events (what happened and what was said).  
Taken together, these two studies suggest that construal level (manipulated in terms of 
temporal distance) can influence different aspects of event memory. However, because of the 
differences between the methodologies of those two initial studies, direct comparisons and 
hence theoretical conclusions are difficult. What we report in the next section is a series of 
closely interconnected studies which will allow greater insight into the generality of the 
construal effect in memory, and a deeper understanding of the theoretical mechanism 
underpinning these effects.  
Beyond our interest in providing a rigorous test of how construal level affects the 
multifaceted and complex nature of how people remember social events, we are also 
motivated by our wish to fully report the results of a nearly four-year research project. We 




embrace recent calls to resist publication bias (Cumming, 2014) and the difficulties it yields 
in establishing a reliable and replicable scientific record. In reporting our project below, we 
include every experiment regardless of the statistical significance of the effects. Some of 
these experiments were under-powered. Some of them were discontinued after preliminary 
analyses suggested that our hypotheses were not supported. Thus, the results of individual 
experiments often do not provide meaningful results. Our aim is to take a broader view of this 
line of work in order to provide a more rigorous test of our hypotheses, as well as more 
accurate estimates of effect sizes for those differences that do emerge.  
The Present Analysis 
We undertook an extended programme of research involving a total of 15 experiments 
which we summarise here.2 Following the model of Tuk, Zhang, and Sweldens (2015), we 
used internal meta-analysis to give us maximum power to estimate the size of construal 
effects on memory. A variety of research paradigms were used over the course of the project 
(see Table 1), including laboratory, field, and on-line methodologies that required participants 
to recall aspects of different types of events (including those witnessed within the context of 
the experiment as well as those encountered independently of the experimental context).  
Our prototypical study was an experiment in which participants witnessed an event 
(either staged by a confederate or as a video-recorded scene) in which one or more target 
persons carried out a variety of actions in a natural environment containing clearly visible 
objects in the background. Either before or after the event, participants were induced to adopt 
either high-level or low-level construal using a variety of manipulations, including temporal 
 
2 We have carried out several further experiments investigating construal level effects on face recognition and 
face processing. We do not include these experiments in the present analysis because they did not expose 
participants to a social event (instead, they employed standard face inversion or facial composite paradigms that 
involved presentation and test of multiple serially-presented face stimuli). Construal manipulations produced 
effects on face processing and recognition, with effect sizes that are comparable to those reported here. Details 
of these experiments are published elsewhere (Wyer, Hollins, & Pahl, 2015; Wyer, Hollins, Pahl, & Roper, 
2015; Wyer, Martin, Pickup, & Macrae, 2012), and details are available from the authors. 




distance, spatial distance, and more direct manipulations of construal (e.g., explaining how 
vs. why an action might be carried out). All of the manipulations used were based on prior 
research stemming from Construal Level Theory (see Trope & Liberman, 2011 for a review). 
In experiments where a confederate was used, the confederate carried out a precisely scripted 
series of actions and made a series of statements in the presence of participants (but not 
specifically directed towards them in all but one study). In other experiments, participants 
watched a video-recorded interaction between two actresses. In both versions, the room 
where the action took place was arranged such that we could assess participants’ memory for 
the configuration of objects within it. 
We also carried out a series of field experiments in which we manipulated construal 
prior to testing participants’ memory for an event that they reported having witnessed 
(specifically the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in the UK). In addition, two 
laboratory studies required participants to recall details of an event that they had personally 
experienced in the months or years prior to the experiment. Finally, we carried out an on-line 
experiment using a video-recording of a burglary in which a man forcibly enters a room and 
removes a number of objects. This range of stimuli and methodologies allowed us to test the 
effect of construal level on event memory comprehensively, including a number of potential 
moderators. Whilst we had no a priori predictions regarding these moderators (described 
below), we include them in order to provide a means for assessing the robustness of construal 
level effects on memory. 
 Each experiment included one or more of the following dependent measures: face 
recognition (selecting a face from a line-up); action memory (true/false judgments about 
things that did or did not happen during the event, or identification of which of two characters 
engaged in an action or made a statement); narrative description of the target event (coded for 




detail and meaning); object and scene memory (recognition from a line-up, and true/false 
judgments regarding room arrangement).  
Method 
Overview and Participants 
 The effects of construal level on memory for social encounters were tested in 15 
experiments with a total of 1230 participants. Gender was recorded for 991 participants 
(27.1% male) and age was recorded for 900 participants (M = 24.1 years, SD = 9.89). Neither 
gender nor age had any effect on memory measures (Gender: meta-regression slope for % 
male = -.001 95% CI [-0.008, 0.006], Z = -0.288, p= .773; Age: meta-regression slope = .005, 
95% CI [-0.013, 0.023], Z = 0.541, p = .588) and hence will not be discussed further. Of the 
15 experiments, one was conducted on-line, five were carried out as field experiments, and 
the remaining 9 took place in laboratory settings. Detailed reports of the methods and results 
of individual studies are available here: https://osf.io/usvgy/ 
Predictors 
A number of factors are potentially important in determining the effects of construal 
level on memory, and are hence included in our analysis as moderators. Each of these is 
discussed below in turn. The classification of each study along each factor can be found in 
Table 1. 
Construal Level Manipulation: Three types of construal manipulation were used, two 
of which involved manipulations of psychological distance. Temporal distance manipulations 
asked participants to consider an event in the near or distant future. Spatial distance 
manipulations asked participants to consider an event in a close or distant location. The third 
type of manipulation involved a ‘How/Why’ task in which participants were asked a series of 
questions about how or why one would engage in different actions (e.g., maintaining good 
health; see Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). Proximal times and locations, and 




‘How’ manipulations were expected to produce low-level construals, whereas distant times 
and locations, and ‘Why’ manipulations were expected to produce high-level construals 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014). See Methodological Appendix for 
details. 
Time From Event to Memory Measure: One might expect that details would be lost 
from memory over time, and in some of the studies included here a matter of months elapsed 
between the event in question and the point at which memory was measured. In other studies, 
memory was assessed mere minutes after the event had occurred. We therefore include time 
as a factor. 
Physical Presence: As noted above, target events varied widely across the studies. Of 
primary interest for the present analysis is the extent to which participants were personally 
present in the events. In this regard, each study was coded for physical presence as ‘high’ if 
participants were physically present at the event, and ‘low’ if participants viewed the event 
on screen (either via the media or via recordings made specifically for this research project).  
Setting: Participants’ engagement with and attention to the event and the dependent 
measures may be influenced by the context in which they took part. We classified 
experimental setting as either field, lab, or online to account for these influences. 
Outcomes 
Memory Target: Across the experiments included the analysis, we assessed memory 
in a number of different ways:  
Face recognition was assessed in nine studies by presenting participants with an array 
of 6 faces (head and shoulders photographs) which included a person who they had seen 
during the target event. Participants were asked to identify which of the faces they had seen 
earlier, and their responses were scored as correct or incorrect.  




We measured narrative (free) recall of behavior in four studies by asking participants 
to remember and write down what had happened during an event. These open-ended 
descriptions were coded by two independent raters for their inclusion of behavioral details vs. 
abstract inferences (see section on Coding and Scoring below).  
We also measured memory using closed-ended (true/false or multiple-choice) 
questions about specific details of the event or more global inferences that could be drawn 
from the event. Closed-ended questions were scored as correct or incorrect, and an average 
score was computed.  
Three experiments also assessed memory for background information (e.g., 
presence/absence of objects or appearance of the physical environment). See Methodological 
Appendix for details. 
Finally, some measures were included in only a single study (recognition of inverted 
(upside-down) faces, an action identification task where participants chose between concrete 
and abstract descriptions of the same action) and so are not included in the analysis.  
Other Variables  
Across several experiments, we also collected measures of processing style, including 
the Snowy Pictures and Gestalt Completion tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976), and a category breadth task (similar to that used in Fujita et al, 2006), as well as a 
general measure of cognitive ability (an analogical reasoning task).  Our preliminary two 
studies (Wyer et al, 2010) produced measures of how the construal manipulation was 
processed (self-reported global and detailed thoughts in Study 1, and the number of 
categories formed during a planning task in Study 2). The results from these measures have 
been included in a recent meta-analysis (Soderberg, Callahan, Kochersberger, Amit & 
Ledgerwood, 2015) and will be reported only briefly here. 
Results 




Coding and Scoring 
Measures of face recognition, and recognition of background (object and scene) 
information, involved participants’ identification of a previously-seen stimulus from an array 
of 4-8 alternatives (face arrays always included 6 options, object arrays included 8 options, 
and scenes were presented with 4 alternate versions) and were scored as correct or incorrect. 
Face recognition tasks typically involved a single trial, and responses were scored as correct 
or incorrect. Object and scene recognition included multiple trials, and hence an average 
score was computed. See Methodological Appendix for examples. 
Narrative (open-ended) recall was coded by two independent coders in each study 
where it was recorded. In cases where participants responded orally (in field studies only), 
responses were transcribed before coding. Coders were instructed to score each narrative on 
the extent to which it contained inferences or abstract information (including traits, emotions, 
goals/intentions) and, independently, on the extent to which it contained details of the event 
(including descriptions of visual details, things that were said and done, the order in which 
things occurred). Both ratings were made on 10-point scales (1=none of this kind of 
information, 10=a great deal of this kind of information). Reliability was satisfactory across 
studies (’s = .89 to .95, average  = .93), with discrepancies between coders being resolved 
by a third independent coder. 
Closed-ended questions about the event were scored as correct or incorrect, based on 
which an average score for each question type was computed.  
Meta-Analytic Approach 
It is important to note that, in many studies included in this analysis, multiple memory 
measures are included. In such cases, assumptions of independence are violated (because 
performance by the same participants on one outcome are likely to be correlated with 
performance on a second outcome). We therefore adopt a two-pronged approach to this 




analysis. First, in order to assess the overall effects of key manipulations, we combine all 
measures within a study following the procedures outlined by Cumming (2012). Second, in 
order to assess the effects of construal level on specific outcomes, we carry out separate 
meta-analyses on each, followed up by between-group comparisons when there is significant 
heterogeneity in the overall effect on that outcome.  
In all cases, effect sizes for the difference between high and low level construal 
conditions were converted to standardized mean differences (d), and aggregate data analyses 
were carried out in JASP (JASP Team, 2020) using a restricted maximum likelihood model 
of random effects. The distribution of effect sizes across measures can be seen in Figures 1 
through 6.  
Following current conventions in reporting the results of meta-analyses, we will focus 
primarily on comparisons of effect size rather than significance levels. We will also refrain 
from discussing effect sizes where those are based on a single study. Following 
recommendations by von Hippel (2015) we note that in many cases we have insufficient 
power (given the small number of studies) for tests of heterogeneity to be reliable; we are 
therefore guided by our theoretical questions in examining between-study variability.  
Finally, note that all effect sizes should be interpreted such that positive numbers reflect an 
advantage for high-level (over low-level) construal on upright face recognition or measures 
of memory for global features of the event, but an advantage for low-level (over high-level) 
construal on memory for detailed aspects of the event. 
Overall Effect of Construal on Memory 
 The average effect size for all memory outcomes (including face recognition, 
object/scene recognition, and both open-ended and closed-ended forms of behavioral recall) 
between Low-Level vs. High-Level Construal conditions was d = 0.107 (SE = .065), 95% CI 
[-0.021, +0.235], Z = +1.645, p = .100. However, there was significant heterogeneity in effect 




sizes, Q(33) = 71.169, p < .001, I2 = 52.943. Our hypotheses suggest that larger effects should 
be observed for some aspects of memory (e.g., face recognition, recall of abstracted person 
information) whilst we expect no effect on other aspects (e.g., object and scene recognition) 
and even negative effects on others (e.g., recall of detailed person information). Thus, we 
carried out sub-group analyses on specific memory outcomes. 
 Effect of Construal on Face Recognition: Construal level had a small-to-medium 
effect on face recognition accuracy, d = 0.304 (SE = .08), CI [+0.146, +0.462], Z = 3.767, p < 
.001 such that performance was higher in high-level construal conditions than in low-level 
construal conditions (see Figure 1). Notably, the effect was only present when participants 
had encountered the target very recently (d = 0.364) and not when the exposure to the target 
was more distant in time (d = 0.122). Further, not all construal manipulations had equivalent 
effects: face recognition was improved by high level construal mainly when it was 
manipulated via psychological distance (time: d =0.438; space: d = 0.385) rather than using 
the how vs. why task (d = 0.201), as well as when participants were physically present at the 
event (d = 0.522) rather than watching a recording of the event (d = 0.179). Finally, the effect 
was larger when the study was carried out in person (field: d = 0.318; lab: d = 0.346) versus 
on-line (d = 0.191). 
 Effect of Construal on Coding of Narrative (Open-Ended) Recall: Open-ended 
narrative recall was coded for the amount of detail/concrete information and meaning/abstract 
information that was included. Construal level had a medium effect on the amount of detail 
included, d = -0.427 (SE = .146), CI [-0.713, -0.142], Z = -2.931, p = .003 such that more 
detail was generated in low-level than high-level construal conditions (see Figure 2). Notably, 
construal only impacted the recall of details when the event had occurred in the recent past (d 
= -0.718) but not in the more distant past (d = -0.187). Construal level had a medium effect 
on the amount of abstract information that was included, d = 0.542 (SE = .133), CI [+0.281, 




+0.804], Z = 4.070, p < .001 such that high-level construal gave rise to more abstract recall 
than did low-level construal (see Figure 3). In contrast to the presence of detail in 
participants’ open-ended descriptions, there was a larger impact of construal on global 
descriptions when the event occurred in the more distant past (d = 0.590) compared to when 
it was more recent (d = 0.467). 
 Effect of Construal on Closed-ended Questions about Behavior: Construal level had 
no effect on participants’ ability to correctly respond to closed-ended questions about the 
event they had witnessed. This was equally true of questions relating to event details, d = 
0.077 (SE = .113), CI [-0.144, +0.298], Z = 0.682, p = .495, those relating to global aspects 
of the event, d = -0.02 (SE = .113), CI [-0.241, +0.201] Z = -0.176, p = .861 (see Figures 4 
and 5).  
Effect of Construal on Background (Object/Scene) Recognition: Construal level also 
had no discernible effect on participants’ ability to accurately recognize objects and 
background scenes, d = -0.046 (SE = 0.144), CI [-0.328, +0.236] Z = -0.321, p = .748 (see 
Figure 6). 
Effectiveness of Construal Manipulations 
 Although we did not carry out specific manipulation checks in every study, those that 
we did obtain suggest that construal manipulations are generally very effective in producing 
processing differences in relation to the content they apply to. Effects of Construal Level on 
manipulation tasks were highly reliable, d = 0.68 (SE = .16), CI[+0.38, +0.99], Z = 4.40, p < 
.001. 
Effect of Construal on Other (Non-Memory) Measures. 
 Whilst not the primary focus of this research, a number of studies included measures 
that were intended to detect differences in processing style, which may contribute to memory 
outcomes. An analysis of global processing measures reveals a small effect of construal level 




on processing outcomes, d = 0.126 (SE = .072) CI [-0.015, +0.268] Z = 1.751, p = .080 such 
that high-level construal led to superior performance on such measures. Notably, few effects 
reached significance in individual studies (see Figure 7), and only one measure (the Gestalt 
Completion Test) produced a reliable meta-analytic effect.  
General Discussion 
 Research based on construal level theory has revealed wide-ranging effects of 
construal level on a variety of outcomes, including judgments, evaluations, and decisions (for 
a review, see Trope & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014). These effects have been 
posited to emanate from the influence of construal level on basic processing style – high-level 
construal is argued to induce holistic or global processing, whereas low-level construal is 
believed to give rise to detail-oriented or local processing. The present research was designed 
to investigate the extent to which construal level and, by extension, processing style affect 
memory for diverse aspects of social events. While previous research (Wyer et al., 2010) has 
suggested a link between psychological distance (a manipulation often linked to construal 
level) and social aspects of memory (face recognition and behavioral recall), no previous 
research had examined the effects of construal level on memory directly, or extended them to 
memory for background or non-focal aspects of the event (e.g., memory for the physical 
environment).   
 The present work provided this investigation, and resulted in a number of important 
findings. First, construal level was shown to have a robust effect on subsequent face 
recognition. High-level construal was consistently associated with more accurate face 
recognition when compared to low-level construal. Moreover, these effects were not limited 
to faces that had been seen in the recent past, but extended to a face encountered only once at 
least five months earlier (e.g., Studies 7-8).  




 Secondly, we demonstrated that construal level has a complex relationship with 
memory for behavioral details and inferences (or gist information). Although construal level 
had a significant effect on the content of participants’ narrative reconstructions of events, the 
nature of the effect differed across studies. When the target event was one that had occurred 
in the very recent past, construal level altered the likelihood that behavioral details emerged 
as part of participants’ recollections (with low-level construal promoting greater recall). In 
contrast, when the target event happened in the more distant past, construal level affected the 
likelihood of retrieving inferences about the event (with high-level construal eliciting greater 
levels of inference in participants’ recollections). 
 Finally, we found that the effects of construal level – at least in our studies – was 
restricted to memory for the focal social elements of the event, and had no discernible effect 
on recognition of background objects or other visual details that were present. One clear 
explanation for this finding is that social information was likely to attract more attention. 
Actors and confederates – unlike objects in the room – are dynamic and thus more inherently 
interesting, whereas the physical information simply formed the background context against 
which the actors were viewed. Second, social aspects of an event may inherently present a 
richer array of information, including both detailed and holistic elements. This may be 
particularly true when one is physically present during the target event, yielding the 
possibility that information is encoded at multiple levels (i.e., both its detailed and holistic 
aspects). Given our premise that construal level alters the way in which information is 
retrieved from memory, such effects are likely to occur only when there are multiple options 
for retrieval. In other words, if event details are not stored in memory, they cannot later be 
retrieved regardless of the cognitive process applied towards retrieval.  
Possible routes through which construal influences memory 




Because of the established effects of construal level on processing style in general, we 
postulate three potential routes through which it may influence social memory: by inducing 
holistic vs. analytic processing, by altering the strategy with which people search their 
memory for information, and by affecting the evidential threshold that is applied when 
determining what ‘counts’ as a valid memory (or an aspect of memory that is relevant to 
report). In other words, beyond direct influences on the overall processing style with which 
perceivers operate when remembering an event, construal level might also affect more 
deliberate memory strategies - both in terms of how people search their memory for 
information they’ve encountered, and also how people decide how to retrieve and report the 
information from that search.  
 Construal level has, in previous work, been found to directly influence processing 
style. High-level construal has been observed to improve performance on tasks that require 
gist extraction (e.g., Snowy Pictures and Gestalt Completion Tests, Ekstrom, French, 
Harman, & Dermen, 1976) whilst low-level construal is advantageous for tasks that require 
attention to details (e.g., Embedded Figures task, Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971). 
Recently, we have established that construal level also affects the use of holistic processing in 
face perception (Wyer et al, 2015b) which also benefits face recognition (Wyer et al, 2015a). 
Yet, in the present work, we found little evidence that processing style was affected by our 
manipulations in ways that paralleled their effects on memory. These findings are discussed 
further below; however, it remains the case that – at least in the paradigms employed in this 
work – we found no support for the idea that construal’s effects on memory were mediated by 
processing style. 
 The other two possibilities – that construal level influences memory via its effects on 
search strategies or reporting decisions – are more plausible accounts for our findings. Both 
of these accounts assume that the contents of memory are unaffected by construal 




manipulations – only the retrieval and reporting from memory is impacted. In all but one of 
the studies reported here, the target event took place before construal level was induced. 
Thus, at the time that construal level was manipulated, participants should have stored an 
equivalent representation of the target event. We suggest that construal level influenced 
participants’ strategies for accessing those representations and/or for reporting them in 
response to memory probes. 
In support of search strategies as a contributing factor, Eyal, Hoover, Fujita, and 
Nussbaum (2011) reported that participants who adopted high-level construals were more 
likely to engage in schema-driven processing of information when forming judgments of 
others. An increased reliance on schemas may also affect memory such that individuals are 
biased to retrieve schema-consistent information (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977) and may neglect details that are irrelevant to or inconsistent with that schema 
(Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979). Similarly, research drawing on the fuzzy trace theory of 
memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) suggests that schema use 
promotes retrieval of gist information at the expense of verbatim details (Tuckey & Brewer, 
2003). Thus, based on evidence that high-level construal promotes schema-based processing,  
participants in our studies who used high-level construal may have been more likely to recall 
general themes (or gist information) from an event at the expense of details (see Bartlett, 
1932).  
 Alternatively, construal level may have influenced performance on memory measures 
by affecting decision processes involved in reporting the contents of one’s memory (see 
Wyer, Hollins, Pahl & Roper, 2015b). Such decision processes may play a role in both 
recognition and recall memory. When individuals are charged with reporting whether or not 
an event occurred or whether or not they have seen someone before (i.e., recognition), they 
must not only retrieve relevant information from a stored memory, but they must also 




compare the retrieved material to the target item in order to determine whether they match. 
Construal level may influence the weight given to relatively holistic vs. detailed information 
in making such a determination (Wyer et al, 2015b). In recall tasks, where one is required to 
generate a description of an event that has transpired, one must first employ some search 
strategy to retrieve information about the event (as described above), and then engage 
decision processes to determine whether material retrieved from memory is relevant to the 
task at hand. As noted above, construal level may influence the kind of information that is 
retrieved; however, even if the information retrieved is itself invariant, construal level may 
influence the weight given to different pieces of information (e.g., specific vs. general) from 
which one constructs their memory report. 
 Thus, we do not suggest that memory representations themselves were impacted by 
construal manipulations within the current studies. Conversely, over time, should the same 
construal level be in place when the event is recalled, the representation may change such that 
inferences are reinforced or that details are either retained or lost. In the domain of face 
recognition, this interpretation is compatible with what we understand about the effects of 
verbal description on face processing. Research by Schooler and others (Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990; Schooler, 1992) on the ‘verbal overshadowing’ effect has demonstrated that 
participants who view a face and are then asked to provide a verbal description of it are 
subsequently less successful at recognizing the face. Although various accounts have been 
proposed to explain this phenomenon (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for a review), most 
research suggests that the stored representation of face does not necessarily change. Rather, 
the act of providing a verbal description induces a relatively detail-oriented processing style, 
which inadvertently carries over to the face recognition task.  
Event memory vs. autobiographical memory 




 Our focus here has been on how construal level influences the way that people recall 
events that they have witnessed. As noted at the outset, events – unlike photographs of faces 
or written descriptions of a person’s behavior – are complex and dynamic, containing both 
visual and semantic elements that change over time as the event unfolds. The literature on 
memory for observed social events has only scratched the surface when it comes to 
understanding such memories (cf R. S. Wyer, Adaval, & Colcombe, 2002 for a review of 
research on memory as narrative), In contrast, research into memory for lived experiences – 
i.e., autobiographical memory – has received comparatively extensive empirical attention, 
and so it is worth commenting on how this work can be situated within social memory 
(including autobiographical memory) more broadly.  
 The line of autobiographical memory research that is perhaps most closely aligned to 
the present work is that which has explored the relationship between visual perspective and 
the psychological distance of autobiographical memories. Work by Libby and colleagues (see 
Libby & Eibach, 2011 for a review) has established a close correspondence between the 
extent to which people feel psychologically close to events in their past and their use of a 
first-person perspective in imagining those events. When people conjure mental images of 
their past using a first-person perspective, they associate those events with more intensity, 
with more concrete detail, and as of greater relevance to the current self. In contrast, adopting 
a third-person perspective when recalling past events is associated with greater feelings of 
detachment and abstraction. There, as in our work, greater psychological distance and greater 
levels of visual and conceptual abstraction are linked.  
 The association between psychological distance and the detail with which 
autobiographical events are imagined has broad implications. For example, witnesses to 
criminal acts are often encouraged to visually recreate the context in which the events 
occurred, encouraging a first-person perspective (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 




1986). Such an approach is believed to be more likely to yield valuable details about the 
crime. Yet, to the extent that such instructions induce psychological proximity (rather than 
distance), they may constrain the information that is likely to emerge – whilst witnesses may 
be better able to report the specific actions undertaken by criminal suspects, their ability to 
recognize those suspects (e.g., from photos or in a line-up) may suffer. Further research might 
fruitfully explore whether the same memory representation might be accessed multiple times, 
under alternating conditions of psychological distance and proximity, in order to maximize 
the accuracy of both types of memory (see Butler, Rice, Wooldridge, & Rubin, 2016). 
Construal and processing measures 
 One final aspect of the present work that bears mention is the finding, across the first 
three studies, that construal level was not consistently associated with any of the three 
measures of processing style (the Gestalt completion task, the snowy pictures task, and the 
category inclusion measure), and yielded only a weak overall effect on processing measures. 
These results are surprising in that they represent a divergence from prior research in which 
manipulations that are believed to alter construal level (e.g., power, as in Smith & Trope, 
2006) have led to performance differences on these tasks. What is particularly striking is that 
construal level failed to influence these tasks in the same studies that it did affect memory 
measures. Notably, our experiments differed from previous studies in which construal level 
has been found to influence processing style, in that they included a larger set of measures 
(multiple processing measures in addition to the main memory measures). The relatively 
‘busy’ experimental sessions may have diluted the effects of construal manipulations on 
processing, which was always measured after the memory tasks that were our main focus. It 
also bears consideration, however, that effects of construal level on memory may be 
independent of their effects on basic perceptual and conceptual processing, and that there 
may be boundary conditions on the relationship between construal level and these (perceptual 




and conceptual) measures of processing style. Further study is required to identify the 
conditions under which these relationships are and are not likely to emerge. 
Conclusions 
 The present research demonstrates that construal level influences multiple aspects of 
memory for social encounters, while also highlighting some potential limitations to the 
effects of construal level. The studies reported here constitute the first known attempt to 
examine memory for multiple elements of the same event, and memory for events in both the 
recent and more distant past, within the same programme of work. Thus, this research lays 
the groundwork for future investigations of the complexity of event memory and the factors 
that influence it. 
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Table 1. Summary of experiments with key manipulations and measures. 
Exp.  N Manipulation Time of Measure in 
Relation to Event  





Near future vs. 
Control vs. 
Distant future 
Minutes after Confederate 
encounter 
Field Face recognition  Self-reported global vs. detailed 
thoughts during manipulation task 
2* 72 Near future vs. 
Distant future 
Minutes after Confederate 
encounter  
Lab Face recognition  
Narrative free recall 
Number of categories formed 
during planning task 
3 104 Near future vs. 
Distant future 
Minutes after Confederate 
encounter 




Gestalt Completion Test, Snowy 
Pictures Task, Categorization, 
Analogical reasoning 
4 145 How vs. Why Minutes after Confederate 
encounter 




Gestalt Completion Test, Snowy 
Pictures Task, Categorization, 
Analogical reasoning 





Narrative free recall 
Gestalt Completion Test, Snowy 
Pictures Task, Categorization, 
Analogical reasoning 
6 130 Near future vs. 
Distant future 
Minutes after Video Online Face recognition 
Closed-ended questions 
 
7 51 How vs. Why Months after Public Event 
(Royal Wedding) 
Field Face recognition 
Closed-ended questions 
 
8 100 How vs. Why Months after Public Event 
(Royal Wedding) 





60 How vs. Why 
  
Months after Public Event 
 (Royal Wedding) 
Field Narrative free recall  
10 100 How vs. Why 
  
Months after Public Event 
 (Royal Wedding) 
Field Inverted face 
recognition 
 





Exp.  N Manipulation Time of Measure in 
Relation to Event 
Type of Event Setting Primary Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Other Measures 
11 74 How vs Why Minutes after Video Lab Face recognition 
Closed-ended questions 
 
12 75 How vs Why Minutes after Video Lab Face recognition 
Closed-ended questions 
 
13 59 Near location 
vs. Control vs. 
Distant location 
Minutes after Video Lab Face recognition  
Closed-ended questions 
 
14 63 How vs. Control 
vs.  Why 
Months after Public Event 
(Various Media) 
Lab Narrative free recall  
15 48 How vs. Why Months after Idiosyncratic/ 
Autobiographical 
Lab Narrative free recall  
 
* Experiments 1 and 2 are reported in full elsewhere (see Wyer, Perfect & Pahl, 2010). 









                         Low-Level Construal         High-Level Construal 
Effect Size [95% CI] 









                                               Low-Level Construal         High-Level Construal 
Effect Size [95% CI] 










                                               Low-Level Construal         High-Level Construal 
Effect Size [95% CI] 









                                  Low-Level Construal         High-Level Construal 
Effect Size [95% CI] 




Figure 5: Accuracy in Answering (Closed Ended) Questions about Global Event Information 
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Figure 7: Performance on Processing Measures: (a) Analogies, (b) Categorization, (c) Gestalt 










(c) Gestalt Completion Test 
 
 
(d) Snowy Pictures Test 
 








 Various types of events were used across experiments: 
 Confederate Encounters: Three types of confederate encounters were used, each of 
which followed a pre-arranged and rehearsed script. Details of two of these are provided 
elsewhere (Wyer et al., 2010 Experiments 1-2). In Experiments 3-5, participants arrived 
(individually or in small groups) at a laboratory room and were greeted by a female 
confederate who appeared to have been working in the room. The room was arranged with 
various items of furniture and other objects.  The confederate informed participants that she 
was just finishing but that they could come in to wait for their experimenter to arrive. After 
participants were seated, the confederate proceeded to put her belongings away and to re-
arrange items in such a way as to draw attention to various objects in the room. She then 
staged a phone call to someone in which she appeared to be distressed about being late. As 
she concluded the call, the experimenter arrived. They had a brief exchange, after which the 
confederate exited the room and participants went on to complete the rest of the experiment. 
 Video: Two videotaped events were used. In Experiment 6, participants viewed a 
video showing a man breaking into a house through a window, searching the surface and 
drawers of a desk, and removing various items. In Experiments 11-13, participants viewed a 
video showing two women talking about a third person whilst carrying out various actions 
(pouring coffee, looking through a magazine, etc). This scene was set in a room where 
specific objects and furniture were in constant view. 
 Public/Media Events: In Experiments 7-10, participants were recruited on the basis 
that they reported having watched television coverage of the ‘Royal Wedding’ (between the 
UK’s Prince William and Katherine Middleton) which had taken place approximately four 




months earlier. In Experiment 14, participants were given a list of widely-seen video-
recorded events (including public events (e.g., the torch being lit at the London Olympics 
opening ceremony), YouTube videos (e.g., ‘Charlie bit me’) and scenes from well-known 
films (e.g., ‘Dark Knight Rises’ – Batman in the ‘Pit’). After completing a construal 
manipulation, they were given a list of the 5 events they had rated most familiar and 
instructed to write a description of each. 
 Idiosyncratic/Autobiographical Events: In Experiment 15, participants were given a 
number of cues (e.g., mountains, Halloween, childhood friend) and asked to generate a 
memory of something that had happened between 2 and 5 years in the past. After completing 
a construal manipulation, they were instructed to write a description of each memory they 
had generated.  
Construal Manipulations 
 Temporal Distance: Manipulations of temporal distance were used in Experiments 1-3 
and Experiment 6. Experiments 1 and 2 are described in full elsewhere (Wyer et al., 2010). 
Experiment 3 used the same manipulation as Experiment 2 (see also Freitas et al, 2004) 
which required participants to sort items into groups for use in the near or distant future. 
Experiment 6 required participants to write a paragraph describing what they would be doing 
the upcoming weekend (near future) or the weekend before Christmas (distant future)  
 Spatial Distance: Experiment 13 included a manipulation of spatial distance, in which 
participants were informed that the scene they viewed on video took place in a nearby 
location (at their own university) or in a distant location (a university in another part of the 
country). 
 How/Why: The remaining experiments manipulated construal level using a variant of 
the How vs. Why task described in Fujita et al (2006). Participants were given an action (e.g., 
Maintaining good health) and were asked to describe either how they would carry out that 




action, or why they would carry out that action. After their initial response, they were then 
asked how or why they would do the thing they described in their response. For example, in 
the how condition, if they responded ‘by exercising’ they would then be asked how they 
would exercise); in the why condition, if they responded ‘because I want to feel good’ they 
would then be asked ‘why do you want to feel good’). This process was repeated two more 
times (always becoming more detailed in the ‘how’ condition or more abstract in the ‘why’ 
condition). 
Memory Measures 
 Face Recognition: Face recognition was measured using photographic arrays in which 
the target face was presented along with five alternatives who were superficially similar in 
appearance (matched for age, race, gender, hair length and color) and without any 
distinguishing features. An example can be seen in Figure A1. 
Figure A1. 
 




 Object recognition: Object recognition was measured in the same way as face 
recognition. For each target object, seven similar distractor objects were included in the array. 
An example can be seen in Figure A2. 
Figure A2 
 
  Scene recognition: Scene recognition measures provided participants with four 
alternative views of different parts of the room in which the event occurred, one of which 
corresponded to the view they actually saw. An example can be seen in Figure A3. 
Figure A3. 
Construal and Event Memory 
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